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Contribution to the Special Issue of Cooperation and Conflict x (x) (2007). 
This article introduces the idea of brands to debates about Nordic models and 
identity. Understanding brands to be more strategic and stable than identities 
the article shows how a Nordic brand was marketed during the Cold War, but 
which has since been challenged and undermined by a number of pressures. 
Central to the Nordic brand has been ideas of Nordic ‘exceptionalism’ – of 
the Nordics as being different from or better than the norm – and of the 
Nordic experience, norms and values as a model to be copied by others. In the 
post-Cold War period key aspects of the Nordic brand have been challenged. 
On the one hand, elements of the Nordic elite appear to have forsaken the 
brand. On the other, broader recognition of a distinct Nordic brand is being 
undermined with the melding of Nordic with European practices and 
processes. The article concludes by asking whether the decline of the Nordic 
brand matters and further explores the link between Nordicity as a brand and 
as an identity. 
 
 
Introduction 
Historically the concepts of the ‘Nordic model’ and Norden/Nordicity have gained 
unique status standing for an ‘exception’ to standard practices in international and 
economic affairs. The idea of the Nordic model has played at least two important roles. 
First, the idea of the ‘Nordic exception’ and of a particular Nordic way of doing things 
has been a central element in Nordic and national identity construction for the Nordic 
states (e.g. Lawler 1997). The implication has been that to be Nordic one has to be 
‘exceptional’ (or at least different from the norm) as, for example, during the Cold War 
when the ‘peace-loving and rational’ Nordics differentiated themselves from the rest of 
‘warlike’ or ‘conflict prone’ Europe. Second, the ‘idea’ of the Nordic model has also been 
presented as something that can be copied and implemented elsewhere. The Nordic 
model in this instance has stood for progress, modernisation and for being better than 
other models. Usually this refers to the socio-economic organisation of the Nordic 
countries. However, foreign policy elements have also been evident, especially in notions 
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of being bridge-builders and trying to teach people how to build a proper security 
community, and in terms of a firm Nordic belief in internationalist solidarism and Third 
Worldism. For instance, Finland’s recurrent reference to the ‘Åland Islands solution’ as a 
model for other countries to copy in dealing with problems of potentially separatist 
regions, or regions where different states put forward competing claims to sovereignty, is 
just one example of how the Nordics have tried to teach outsiders how to settle conflicts 
and build a peaceful security community (see Mykkänen 2005; Finnish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2004). 
 
So, the Nordic model has stood out both as an identity and as a model to copy. Indeed, I 
want to suggest that the idea of the Nordic model has become something of a brand by 
which to position the Nordics in the world and provide them with an international role. 
As such, being ‘Nordic’ and adhering to the Nordic model has implied engaging in some 
types of action, and not others. Increasingly, however, it is argued that this ‘brand’ is now 
passed its sell-by-date. This is not necessarily to say that the Nordics are changing their 
behaviour and no longer conforming to the ‘model’ (though in some instances they may 
be), but that whether certain practices and attitudes will continue to be understood as 
specifically ‘Nordic’ (rather than European, for example) is open to question. The result 
is that recognition of the ‘Nordic brand’ is being undermined, which in turn poses 
questions for the future of the idea of ‘Nordic exceptionalism’ as a central part of Nordic 
identity. 
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The article starts by discussing the idea of identity as a ‘brand’ that can be projected and 
marketed to an international audience. Next it lays out a number of factors that have been 
central to ideas of the Nordic model and the idea of Nordic exceptionalism. It then notes 
that there are reasons to suggest that each of these elements are now facing challenges 
such that the idea of a distinct Nordic position or model is increasingly less obvious. 
These elements are undermining ideas of the Nordic model as being both an identity and 
as something to be copied and aspired for by others. In short, it is argued that for various 
reasons the ‘Nordic brand’ is losing its marketability. The article concludes with a 
question: if the Nordic model and brand is passed its sell-by-date is this something to be 
mourned, or embraced? 
 
 
Branding Identity 
To start a few words about identity and the concept of ‘brand’ are required. This is 
important as the concepts of brand and identity, although closely related, are not 
interchangeable. Thus, the decline of Nordicity and the Nordic model as a brand does not 
necessarily entail the decline or loss of Nordic identity(ies) as such. So what is the 
difference between the concepts and what is the benefit of introducing the idea of 
‘brands’ into discussions of the Nordic case? 
 
This article understands identities in constructivist and narrative terms, meaning identities 
should not be understood as fixed or pre-given, but as fluid and open to change and 
transformation. Identities are intersubjectively negotiated in interactions with others. To 
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be able to act selves need to construct narratives that locate themselves in time and space 
and in relation to other actors. Such narratives, however, constantly need retelling and 
also need to be endorsed and accepted by the relevant audience if an identity or set of 
identities is to hang together.1 This last point is important in that since selves (including 
collectivities like nations) are embedded in many different relationships selves 
characteristically have multiple, not singular, identities. Indeed, the very unit that is 
understood as the self may expand and contract as one shifts between relationships. Thus, 
whilst a person’s identification may shift between being a ‘woman’, ‘mother’, 
‘industrialist’, ‘explorer’ etc., depending on the social context in which that individual 
finds herself, in other contexts that individual may meld into a bigger collective self in 
which the unit of self might be a family, team, trade union, nation, civilisation etc… 
 
This is all broadly accepted, but the point about multiplicity is important when 
differentiating between identities and brands. Whereas identities need to be seen as 
multiple and fluid and also as being projective into the future, the concept of ‘brand’ is 
arguably more specific. The concept is usually used in regard to the economic 
marketplace and the buying and selling of commodities. In this respect a brand is usually 
understood as a particular version of a particular thing, a brand of car for example.2 
However, as Klein (2000) notes, sometimes brands become ends in themselves: the brand 
itself becomes the product, the brand standing for a particular lifestyle choice or political 
philosophy (e.g. Body Shop). In such instances the actual material ‘product’ becomes less 
important than the idea (brand) being sold. As will become evident below, and as argued 
                                                 
1 On narrative approaches to identity see Carr (1986); Ringmar (1996); Schrag (1997). 
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by Kuisma elsewhere in this volume, to some extent the brand of the ‘Nordic model’ has 
developed elements of this about it, where it is not so much what the Nordic model 
actually is that counts, but rather what it is seen to stand for. Thus, the article is more 
concerned with the ‘idea’ of the Nordic model as representing a deviation from the norm 
or as something to be copied, rather than with its particular content per se – though the 
two are obviously closely connected. In general terms, however, in the marketplace 
branding is used to try and convince people to buy one product instead of another and 
where a successful brand gets a reputation for being better (however defined) than other 
brands. As such the brand becomes something people recognise, admire and even aspire 
to have or associate with. Brands, however, can also lose popularity, appearing worse 
than other brands or seeming outdated. 
 
This article argues that during the Cold War the Nordic States were rather successful in 
marketing a ‘Nordic brand’ on the international scene. This brand had various elements to 
it, as will be demonstrated below, but included a particular socio-economic model and 
approach to international affairs (content) as well as simply the ‘idea’ that the Nordic 
model represented something distinct. Whilst these ideas and elements were important 
aspects of identity construction, the notion of brand points to the rather strategic way in 
which the Nordic brand was depicted, first as better than other brands (of state/foreign 
policy) and, second, as something that others could, in theory at least, buy into and 
purchase in the marketplace of ideas. Moreover, whilst identities can be understood as 
malleable and relatively hard to pin down the idea of brand in this instance points to a set 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 For a discussion of the concept of brand see Keller (2003: ch.1). 
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of ideas, norms and practices that might be conceived in terms of an overall (if loosely 
defined) package. The aim of marketing a brand in this instance might be driven by 
identity considerations to convince the audience that you have a particular identity, but it 
might also be to sell the package of ideas, norms and practices and to carve out a niche 
for one’s product and oneself within the global marketplace/international system. 
 
Another important difference between brands and identities (especially when thinking 
about international politics) is that brands are not necessary. Whereas it is imperative for 
people/nations to construct an identity for themselves if they are to be able to act in the 
world3 (and for collectivities if they are to even exist) brands are not like this. It is quite 
possible to have an international identity without having a brand. The opposite is not the 
case. All states, for example, make various identity claims, but not all states actively try 
to market a particular approach to global politics. The Nordic example is particularly 
interesting in this respect as at times deliberate efforts have been made by the Nordic 
political elite to market a common brand. This points to another reason for introducing 
the concept of brand, which is that discussions about a collective Nordic identity can 
become difficult because the Nordic countries generally narrate Nordicity in slightly 
different ways for different historical reasons (Østergård 1998; Hansen and Wæver 
1998). Nordic identity means different things to different people in different locations. 
However, I argue that aside from these various and sometimes divergent narratives the 
Nordic countries have collectively and rather deliberately tried to construct and market a 
singular ‘Nordic brand’, a particular common ‘Nordic experience’ or way of doing things 
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that is also presented as applicable for others. It is this marketing of a particular brand 
that justifies treating the Nordic countries collectively in this article. It is also important, 
however, to reflect briefly on exactly ‘who’ has been engaged in these branding 
exercises. In this respect I posit the existence of a pan-Nordic epistemic community that 
had its origins in the Scandinavianist movement of the nineteenth century, but which was 
further enhanced in the early-mid twentieth century through the creation of various so-
called Nordic societies and later the Nordic Council (Østergård 1998). As I will argue, 
one of the reasons for the current weakening of the Nordic brand would seem to be the 
decline of a privileging of this trans-national community amongst the Nordic elite.  
 
Before turning to the substantive discussion some methodological points are also 
necessary. Like identities brands cannot simply be proclaimed. To sell they need to be 
accepted and recognised as distinctive by the international audience (Ringmar 2002). 
Similarly, for the Nordic brand to exist it has also been important that collective Nordic 
positions built around cohesive policy preferences could be framed, and that there has 
been acceptance that each country has authority to speak on behalf of the Nordic 
collective.4 These points are important because when people talk about the possible death 
of Norden and the Nordic model it is essentially because they see elements of this scheme 
as no longer holding true. For example, it is no longer clear that the Nordic countries hold 
to clearly defined or distinctive positions, interests or identities that mark out the Nordic 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 As Ringmar (1996: 13) puts it, “it is only once we know who we are that we can know what we want” 
(original emphasis). 
4 These points are developed from Laatikainen (2003: 412-13). 
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states from others, or whether some Nordic citizens even identify with a particular 
‘Nordic’ position anymore. 
 
Likewise, it is also unclear whether other actors (the audience) so clearly identify the 
Nordics as a separate group with a distinct brand as they did previously, or identify the 
Nordic model/brand as being particularly Nordic. To the extent that confirmation from 
the international audience disappears it might be argued that so too does the Nordic 
model – at least in the sense of being a Nordic model to be copied because of its distinct 
Nordic attributes. In turn, the lack of confirmation may not simply undermine the model 
elements, but may also undermine the very notion of what it is to be Nordic in any case. 
This is to say that if the idea of the Nordic ‘exception’ is no longer confirmed by the 
audience, then this ‘exceptionalist’ element to Nordicity may need to be rethought. This 
indicates that if the Nordic brand is no longer recognised, or no longer sells, then the 
challenge to the brand may also be challenging particular constructions of Nordic identity 
as exceptional. The implications of this are returned to in the Conclusion where the 
connection between the marketing of the Nordic brand to the construction of Nordic 
identity is discussed. 
 
Finally, the focus on the concept of ‘brand’ here makes it important to distinguish 
between ‘rhetoric’ (marketing) and ‘reality’ (actual practices). Obviously, from a 
discursive and constructivist perspective such a distinction is problematic since our 
discourses are constitutive of social reality (Searle 1995). The reason for introducing the 
distinction, however, is to assert that the article is interested primarily in how a ‘Nordic 
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brand’ has been marketed over time, rather than whether the Nordics have always lived 
up to the brand. Put otherwise, a few faulty models will not undermine a manufacturer 
with an established reputation for producing reliable cars. However, once unreliability 
(failure to live up to the rhetoric/reputation) becomes endemic then the brand will be 
compromised. In the following, therefore, whilst inconsistencies with the proclaimed 
Nordic brand will be noted, highlighting them does not invalidate focusing analysis on 
the concept of the brand. At the same time, some of the arguments for the death of the 
Nordic brand in the post-Cold War period are clearly related to the view that the failure 
of Nordic practices to live up to the rhetoric of the brand have become seriously 
compromising.  
 
To summarise, therefore, whilst brands may be located in different identity narratives 
telling us who we are, they differ from identities in that they are intrinsically more 
strategic, are primarily targeted at external audiences, are relatively stable (unlike fluid 
multiple identities), and precisely because of their fixity are also more open than (fluid) 
identities to being destabilised in the face of changing conditions. 
 
 
Establishing the Brand: Elements of Exceptionalism/the Model 
In this section the existence and development of a ‘Nordic brand’ premised on ideas of a 
Nordic model and Nordic exceptionalism towards international affairs will be 
highlighted. This requires demonstrating not simply that the Nordic countries tried to 
carve out a distinct identity for themselves during the Cold War, but also that in doing 
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this they tried to market to the international audience a particular Nordic brand. The 
reasons for doing this were largely strategic and based on a desire to try and keep the 
region outside the main theatre of the Cold War conflict. 
 
The Nordic model is usually seen to have a number of elements that taken together have 
contributed to the idea of Nordic exceptionalism and a particular Nordic way of relating 
to international affairs. There are various ways of categorising the different elements of 
the ‘Nordic model’ and Nordic exceptionalism (e.g, Wæver 1992; Mouritzen 1995). As 
such the scheme outlined here is simply being used to draw out key points in relation to 
the question under discussion, whilst there is in reality much overlap between the 
analytical categories adopted below. 
 
Peaceful societies and bridge builders 
The Nordic model/brand rested, first and foremost, on a claim that the Nordic countries 
were exceptional in regard to the Cold War reading of international politics. Instead of 
the inevitable conflict between states the Nordics presented themselves as having 
successfully overcome the security dilemma between themselves to establish a region of 
peace and prosperity. This image became popularised in Karl Deutsch’s (1957) 
understanding of the region as a unique security community in which stable expectations 
had developed such that an intra-Nordic war had become unthinkable. Deutsch’s account 
was eagerly endorsed in the Nordic countries and helped foster what might be termed a 
‘Nordic peace industry’. On the one hand, this involved attempts to explain and 
propagate the reasons for internal Nordic peacefulness. However, it also fed into a 
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‘peace-driven’ approach to international relations in general. This could be seen in the 
state sponsored development of peace movements and peace research institutions in each 
country. For example, the creation of Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the 
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) in the early-mid 1960s was followed 
with the establishment of Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI - 1970) in Finland 
and Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI – 1980s) in Denmark.5
 
Another element in this peace driven approach to international relations was the adoption 
of a broadly anti-militarist stance to international affairs, meaning that resort to military 
force should be rejected in all but the direst of circumstances and that if possible 
international problems should be resolved through diplomacy and recourse to the 
UN/international law. Anti-militarism was understood differently in the different 
countries. In Denmark, beyond peacekeeping missions, the relevance and utility of armed 
force, even as a deterrent, was questioned (Rasmussen 2005b: 69). In contrast, Finland 
and Sweden maintained considerable defensive capabilities and defence industries 
(Sweden even considered developing nuclear weapons in the 1950s), with these being 
justified as necessary to preserve their neutrality.6 Thus, an effective military was 
required precisely so that it would not have to be used. At least in the Swedish case 
military readiness became seen as a key support to the ambition to be a ‘moral great 
power’ (Åselius 2005: 26-7). 
                                                 
5 On the development of the discipline of peace research and of the peace research institutes in the Nordic 
countries see, Gleditsch (2004); Vesa (1987). Another important symbol in contributing to the Nordic 
peace brand has been the Nobel Peace Prize, which was first awarded in 1901. 
6 Since the end of the Cold War it has become apparent that Sweden maintained secret military links with 
the USA and did not necessarily live up to its proclaimed neutrality in the strictest sense. For the purpose of 
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 Taken together, this peaceful Nordic security community was seen as different from the 
norm during the Cold War, with the north existing as a region where power politics 
approaches were largely eschewed. Moreover, in Nordic identity-building discourses this 
‘peaceful’ heritage was usually extended back to before the Cold War. In the Danish case 
the shift to peace driven approaches to international affairs was often dated to the 1864 
Schleswig-Holstein War after which it was (and still is) argued Denmark dramatically re-
oriented its approach, rejecting realpolitik in favour of Scandinavian solidarity and 
neutrality (Joenniemi 2006: 19). Whilst such accounts may be true they also contributed 
to the historicisation and naturalisation of this particular understanding of Nordicity.  
 
During the Cold War such stories had practical implications. To an important degree to 
be Nordic meant retaining a distance from the Cold War conflict. Moreover, the Nordics 
engaged in considerable efforts to act as mediators between East and West and 
established a brand for themselves as bridge-builders in the East-West conflict. Such an 
approach was typified in the comment of Finnish President Urho Kekkonen (1970: 94) to 
the UN General Assembly in 1961 that “We see ourselves as physicians rather than 
judges; it is not for us to pass judgement nor to condemn, it is rather to diagnose and to 
try to cure”. Key elements of such an approach, for example, became Finland’s 
sponsorship of the CSCE process that put an emphasis on dialogue through the 
development of institutional links and that also put questions of human rights onto the 
Cold War debating table. Similarly, the limitations that Denmark and Norway placed on 
                                                                                                                                                 
the idea of the ‘Nordic brand’, however, it is important that these links remained secret and only a handful 
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their links with NATO was also understood as calming East-West tensions, whilst the 
fact that the Nordic countries became champions of nuclear disarmament should also be 
noted.7 More particularly, the Nordic countries’ geopolitical position between the Eastern 
and Western Blocs, but on the fringes and in the ‘quiet corner’ of Europe, also provided 
them with geographical resources by which they could develop this bridge-building role 
and brand. As Ingebritsen (2002) has pointed out, the Nordic countries did not sit back 
and withdraw into isolation from the Cold War, but became active ‘norm entrepreneurs’ 
who attempted to introduce and strengthen new global norms of cooperation, especially 
between the great powers.  
 
Internationalist solidarism 
The second element to the idea of Nordic exceptionalism during the Cold War can be 
termed ‘internationalist solidarism’. During the Cold War the Nordic brand (and the 
Nordic model) attained a highly moral dimension. Not only did the Nordics seek to stand 
between the East-West conflict, but they also sought to play a role in overcoming the 
North-South divide by trying to speak on behalf of the world’s poorest and most 
excluded. Central to the idea of Nordic solidarity with the Third World was an emphasis 
on the right of all nations to be free to develop without external (i.e. great power or 
colonial) interference. Thus, in an article written in the early 1980s on ‘Sweden’s Role in 
the World’, and reflecting on Swedish policy towards the Third World, Prime Minister 
Olof Palme proclaimed: 
                                                                                                                                                 
of military personnel and government officials were aware of them (af Malmborg 2001: 148-51). 
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 We have taken a stand for national freedom and independence… As a 
small state we have as our goal a world in which the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention are fully respected. This has also 
made it possible for Sweden, albeit to a modest extent, to build bridges 
between South and North in a period marked by crisis and the risk of 
polarization (quoted in Trägårdh 2002: 153). 
 
Solidarity with the Third World was perhaps most important to Sweden, where it became 
a highly idealistic element of the country’s foreign policy. From the 1960s onwards the 
idea of the country having become the ‘world’s conscience’ was widely debated and seen 
as a central part of Sweden’s international mission (Trägårdh 2002: 152; Bergman in this 
issue). This was clearly demonstrated in Sweden’s vociferous criticisms of American 
involvement in Vietnam. As the Minister for International Development Cooperation 
proclaimed in a speech in 1975: 
 
Throughout we have sided with the Vietnamese in their struggle. We 
have done this in the firm conviction that small nations must be 
entitled to decide their own destinies without interference from the 
great powers (quoted in Bangura 2004: 26). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Central were proposals made by Finnish President Urho Kekkonen in 1963 and 1978 for a Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone in the north, and which were also supported by Olof Palme in 1982 (af Malmborg 
2001: 163). 
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Swedish criticisms even included the granting of a kind of asylum to American military 
deserters and were also evident in condemnations of the position of African Americans in 
the United States (Bangura 2004: 27). Neutrality was not seen as constraining, but rather 
as conferring a right and duty to speak out on international and moral issues. Importantly 
criticism was not confined to the United States, but extended to the Soviet Union’s 
actions in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland as well as the apartheid regime in South 
Africa. 
 
However, a focus on international justice was important for all the Nordic countries and 
as such a central element of Nordic identity and the Nordic model became the moral duty 
to help those less fortunate than oneself. The principal vehicle for this approach became 
the UN which was supported, not least because its multilateralism was seen as a way to 
curb the excesses of the great powers. Moreover, it was largely through the UN (and 
especially the UN Development Programme and other agencies like UNICEF and 
UNESCO) that the Nordic countries directed high levels of development aid and 
successfully carved out an image of themselves as being moral actors and ‘good states’, 
unlike other ‘neo-liberal’ northern states (including the EEC) that they depicted as intent 
on exploiting the Third World (Trägårdh 2002: 157). Particularly notable was that the 
Nordic countries were the first to achieve the UN target of devoting 0.7 percent of GDP 
to Official Development Assistance (ODA). Moreover, the Nordics also stood out in that 
the distribution of ODA was only rarely tied to national commercial and strategic 
interests, but was more driven by the goal of helping those in greatest need (Lawler 2003: 
158; Ingebritsen 2002: 18-19; Bergman in this issue). 
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 The Nordic focus on international justice and equality was also evidenced by the fact that 
throughout the Cold War they provided 25 percent of the military personnel deployed on 
UN operations. They also promoted alternative approaches to security that took more 
account of issues pertinent in the Third World, such as concepts of common (e.g. the 
Palme Commission’s 1982 report on Common Security), individual and human security, 
and not least the idea of sustainable development. The result, as Laatikainen (2003: 417) 
notes, was that during the Cold War the Nordics carved out a niche for themselves, not 
only between East and West, but also between North and South. In the South they were 
not only identified as a single group, but were also understood as ‘different’ from the rest 
of the North (West). As she also notes, this was assisted by the fact that within the UN 
the Nordic countries acted as a single group. During the Cold War it was common for one 
of the Nordics to speak on behalf of them all. This was only possible because there was 
considerable cohesion between them in terms of policy preferences, but also because 
other states also recognised them as a cohesive group with distinct interests and policies 
that could be identified as distinctively ‘Nordic’ (Laatikainen 2003). Similarly, Haggrén 
(2006) has noted that the Nordics’ outspoken political aim within UNESCO was twofold. 
First and foremost it was a branding exercise designed to stress “Nordic unity and create 
an image of Norden”. Thus, the “central idea of the [sic] cooperation has been the [sic] 
cooperation itself, unity has mattered more than content”. Second, it was to export Nordic 
values. Such collective and concerted action went a considerable way in gaining 
recognition for the development of a distinct ‘Nordic brand’. 
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Egalitarian social democracy 
The third element to the Nordic model during the Cold War related to ideas of 
egalitarianism and the acceptance of a social democratic model of distributive justice by 
all major political parties for how the Nordic countries should be organised internally 
(Kuisma in this issue). As Patomäki (2000: 116-7) notes, during the Cold War the idea of 
the Nordic economic model as a Third Way between US capitalist neo-liberalism and 
Soviet-style state socialism became another notable element of a distinctive Nordic 
identity. This economic model, with its emphasis on distributive justice, was conceived 
as morally superior to its contenders. At the same time the Nordic social democratic 
welfare state also became a symbol of Nordic bridge-building; rather than seeing 
socialism and capitalism as polarised extremes the Nordics presented themselves as 
having successfully amalgamated the poles and, to some extent, transcended the 
ideological conflict (Hanhimäki 1997: xii).  
 
Putting all three elements together, during the Cold War a ‘Nordic brand’ was advanced 
which was essentially built around the idea that the Nordic countries, in terms of foreign 
policy, international morality and social justice, both at home and abroad, were ‘better’ 
than the rest. As Max Jakobson (1987: 139-40), a senior Finnish diplomat and former 
Ambassador to the UN, asserted in 1987 in regard to the UN General Assembly: 
 
[this] little [Nordic] group of politically stable, socially advanced, 
prosperous countries which have no major international claims to press 
or to counter, no present or recent colonial record, and no racial 
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problems, represents moderation and rationality in an assembly often 
swayed by fanatic or neurotic forces.  
 
The accuracy, or otherwise of this statement (e.g., discrimination against the Sami 
population, Denmark’s continuing colonial presence in the Faroes and Greenland, forced 
sterilisations…) is not the point. What matters is that Nordic identity and the Nordic 
brand were presented as the promise of a better, more advanced, more peaceful, less 
militarised future to that offered by the Cold War combatants. Thus, the Nordic countries 
did not simply try to isolate themselves from the Cold War: they marketed a brand of 
rational/modern society and international order that they believed should be projected 
onto the international scene and copied (Wahlbäck 1982: 13). 
 
 
The Nordic Brand: Passed its Sell-by-Date? 
Today, however, it seems that the three elements to the brand of Nordic exceptionalism 
noted above are becoming less exceptional and less particularly Nordic. Moreover, in 
some instances the Nordics appear to have given up on aspects of the Nordic model and 
have become less interested in marketing the brand. Consequently, the elements of 
‘cohesion’, ‘recognition’ and ‘autonomy’ that became central in the development and 
acceptance of a Nordic brand built around a specific Nordic model and position in 
international affairs are being undermined.  
 
Peaceful societies and bridge builders 
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For example, ideas of the Nordic countries as particularly peaceful societies and bridge-
builders make less sense in a post-Cold War context. Given the transformations in Europe 
since the end of the Cold War, the idea that the Nordic region stands out as more peaceful 
and less conflict ridden than Central Europe has become problematic (Wæver, 1992: 87). 
With the end of the Cold War the Nordic model appeared outdated and increasingly hard 
to market. Writing in the early 1990s Wæver (1992) argued that Norden was increasingly 
reminiscent of the past ‘statist’ Europe preoccupied with matters of territorial 
sovereignty, in contrast to a rejuventated new and future-oriented Europe to the south 
more focused on integration. As it happens processes of cooperation and border breaking 
within the Baltic Sea Region have in many respects surpassed that of the rest of Europe, 
with the proliferation of multiple networks, regimes and organisations linking together all 
the Baltic littoral states. In this respect northern Europe (but not specifically Nordic 
Europe) remains a front runner and potential model.8 However, as noted the ‘Nordic’ 
elements here are less clear, whilst the idea of being somehow ‘more peaceful’ than the 
rest of Europe seems anachronistic. 
 
Similarly, in terms of bridge-building the Nordic states have also continued to try and 
play important roles and continue to try and market themselves as being ‘good states’ 
with something unique to offer. This was evident, for example, in the conference on 
‘Nordic Peace Diplomacy’ sponsored by the Norwegian Embassy in Denmark and hosted 
at the Danish Institute for International Studies in February 2005. The conference’s goal 
                                                 
8 For example, the Baltic Sea Region has been seen as an area for experimentation in developing structures 
of European governance and in particular for building a new relationship with Russia (Browning and 
Joenniemi 2004: 248; Browning 2003). 
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was “to discuss how the [sic] Nordic peace diplomacy can continue to make a difference 
in the post-9/11 world characterised by the threat of terror and an increased resort to 
military force” (Jakobsen et al., 2005: 1). As the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Jan Petersen (2005), put it: “We [the Nordics] feel that we have a moral obligation to 
pursue peace and stability when – and where – we can”. Other speakers included Danish 
Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller, former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt and former 
Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, indicating the event had some prestige and that the 
idea of a particular Nordic approach to peace diplomacy still resonates. Moreover, there 
have also been notable practical applications of this desire to maintain an important role 
as bridge-builders on the world stage. This has been evident, for example, in Norway’s 
diplomacy in the Middle East, Sri Lanka and the Philippines, and in the role Ahtisaari 
played in facilitating links between the US and Russia over the Kosovo crisis and more 
recently in directing the Aceh peace process.  
 
However, despite the apparent aim to maintain a distinct Nordic peace brand this has 
been undermined by several developments. Not least, despite some successes Nordic 
attempts to play a mediating role, particularly between the West and Russia have been 
sidelined. This is not only due to the Cold War’s end, but because cooperation and 
confidence building between the US/NATO and Russia has increasingly taken place face 
to face in forums like the NATO-Russia Council, and has not required mediators or 
neutral venues. Moreover, in the context of 9/11 and the War on Terror, and with 
international politics increasingly being framed along different lines, the geopolitical 
position of the Nordic states is less of a resource (at least in terms of bridge building). 
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 A further point concerns these societies’ traditional anti-militarism. As noted above, anti-
militarism has generally been understood in terms of an unwillingness to use military 
force, and one of the three sessions of the conference on Nordic Peace Diplomacy was 
specifically about “Nordic peace diplomacy versus the increased resort to force” 
(emphasis added) (Jakobsen et al., 2005: 2). In the context of the War on Terror, 
however, anti-militarism understood this way is becoming problematic for some of the 
Nordic countries. Expectations for engagement are growing with the development of the 
EU’s ESDP and NATO’s rapid reaction forces, and all the Nordic countries have passed 
legislation making the deployment of peacekeeping forces easier. However, for those 
Nordic countries with military links to the United States through NATO the pressures and 
expectations have been higher.  
 
Developments in Denmark and Norway are especially interesting (on Denmark see 
Lawler in this issue). In Norway, the previous Cold War view that the armed forces 
existed precisely so that their deterrence effect would mean they would not have to be 
used, has radically changed. Today they have been re-conceptualised precisely as a tool 
that ‘should’ be used. Or as the Norwegian Defence Minister declared in 2002, “the 
reason for having a defence is using it” (quoted in Græger 2005: 412). Similarly, whereas 
Denmark opted out of some of the foreign and security policy elements of the Treaty on 
European Union in 1992, out of concerns that it might draw the country into ‘militaristic 
adventurism’ (Lawler 2003: 163), Rasmussen (2005b: 67, 82) has demonstrated how, at 
least in government circles, the military is now seen as a tool of considerable utility, 
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especially since the declaration of the War on Terror. As he puts it, the debate has shifted 
from focusing on whether force ‘should ever’ be used, to debating for which purposes it 
‘should be’ used. Notably, therefore, the 2004 Defence Agreement argues that the Danish 
military forces should be redirected towards ‘high-intensity operations’ – war fighting 
rather than peacekeeping (Rasmussen 2005a: 46). The shift entailed here is radical as it 
represents a Clausewitzian acceptance that war is simply politics by other means. In 
Rasmussen’s terms, in the Danish debate the question of whether or not to use force has 
become framed in terms of utility, not morality as previously. 
 
Indeed, in its deployment of combat units to Afghanistan and Iraq Rynning (2003: 24) 
argues that Denmark has shifted from being a ‘civilian actor’, preferring to regulate the 
conflicts of other people and minimising the use of force, to becoming a ‘strategic actor’, 
“willing to use armed forces because they believe these to be appropriate means in the 
(allegedly) inevitable confrontation with hostile forces in the international arena”. As 
such Denmark has forsaken traditional Nordic anti-militarism for a position alongside the 
US, UK, France and Russia, “all countries with a sense of vital interests and a willingness 
to fight militarily for them”. Moreover, in this process Knudsen (2004) argues that 
Denmark (admittedly somewhat unwillingly) also gave up on its (and the Nordic 
model’s) previous emphasis on the primary role of the UN in solving international 
conflicts, and instead placed support for the pre-emptive actions of a key ally above 
support for the primacy of international law.9
                                                 
9 This shift in policy, however, has not necessarily been definitive. Notably, the Danish Foreign Minister 
continues to feel the need to stress Denmark’s inclusion in that Nordic group of countries who “consider 
themselves to be among the staunchest supporters of the United Nations”. However, in the same speech he 
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 In contrast to this Clausewitzian shift in Danish policy, the Finnish, Norwegian and 
Swedish governments have retained more vocal support for the UN and the primacy of 
international law in world politics. Indeed, criticisms of the war against Iraq and the 
ultimate rejection of the UN process by the US-led coalition of the willing were notable. 
Swedish Prime Minister, Göran Persson, was adamant that international law should be 
respected (cited in Vogt 2004: 67), whilst already in 2000 Finnish President Tarja 
Halonen was asserting that “There is no clear legal foundation for armed intervention” 
and that when the international community talks about intervention it should always be 
kept in mind that intervention can also include diplomatic, humanitarian and peace 
operations” (quoted in Vesa 2001: 63). In other words, the significant Clausewitzian shift 
to thinking of war as a political tool has been less apparent in the other Nordic countries. 
As Rasmussen (2005a: 52) indicates, Denmark’s different position can be understood in 
the context of a growing view in the country that the “Danes are kidding themselves if 
they think they are any different from the rest of the Western world” and that as such 
“they ought to accept responsibility for what happens in the rest of the world”. Such a 
view indicates an undermining of notions of Nordic exceptionalism in Denmark, where 
Nordic exceptionalism is understood in terms of a Nordic identity and brand that is 
fundamentally different from other dominant streams in international relations. 
 
However, if the Danes have answered the question of how to take ‘responsibility’ by re-
appraising the utility and morality of using military force, the other Nordic countries have 
                                                                                                                                                 
also remarked that no “all-encompassing ‘Nordic way’ to peace diplomacy” exists, thereby leaving space 
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retained a focus on traditional Nordic peacekeeping and peace support operations. 
Finland and Sweden, for example, have been at the forefront in bringing civilian crisis 
management and policing operations on to the agenda of the EU’s developing European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), precisely as a balance to the developing military 
dimension (Bergman in this issue).10 Key aspects have been their promotion of the 
Petersburg Tasks within the ESDP, with their focus on humanitarian and crisis 
management issues, and their promotion of the headline goal to create a 5000 strong 
rapidly deployable police force, agreed at the EU’s Feira summit in 2000. Beyond this 
Finland, Sweden and Norway will also constitute one of the EU’s Battle Groups that are 
being created as part of the European Rapid Reaction Force.11 All this indicates a desire 
to retain a particular traditional ‘Nordic’ focus on issues of peace building and conflict 
resolution. However, as Carlsnaes (2005: 405) notes in regard to Sweden, activism in the 
peacekeeping field is increasingly being linked to the EU, rather than the other Nordic 
countries. The Nordic dimension is thus increasingly blurring with a European profile.  
 
As such, although interest remains apparent in preserving a distinct Nordic brand and 
profile in this sphere, this brand is also being challenged. A number of contradictions are 
apparent: first in that the region no longer appears more peaceful than the rest of Europe; 
and, second because some of the Nordic countries have de-emphasised and rejected the 
utility of the brand when it comes to military issues. Moreover, in a context when 
                                                                                                                                                 
for alternative approaches and arguably blurring the notion of a Nordic brand (Møller 2005). 
10 On the growing emphasis on civilian crisis management in Sweden see, Rieker (2004: 380). 
11 Denmark cannot participate as a result of its defence opt out. 
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peacekeeping, crisis management and stability creation is being dominated by EU 
structures it is becoming harder to maintain a distinct Nordic profile. 
 
 
Internationalist solidarism 
Similar concerns exist in the second area, where the previous emphasis on internationalist 
solidarism and Third Worldism as central to the Nordic model and a ‘Nordic’ identity, 
role and outlook on world affairs, has also been challenged, though in two distinct ways. 
First, Denmark has again signalled that its adherence to internationalist solidarist ideals 
may not be as committed as previously. This has been evident in increasingly negative 
attitudes towards immigrants in Danish society (similar trends exist in Norway), but also 
in significant cutbacks in development aid since the liberal-conservative government of 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen came to power in November 2001 (see Lawler in this issue). 
Despite the cuts Denmark (with Norway) still tops the list of official development aid 
(ODA) as a percentage of GDP and continues to sell itself as a ‘good state’ in these 
terms. However, Olsen (2003: 80-3) notes these cuts occurred at a time after 9/11 when 
virtually all other OECD countries were increasing their ODA budgets. Moreover, 
irrespective of Denmark’s continuing significant development aid provision, it is clear 
that such actions (as well as an attempt to close the country’s human rights institute, 
provoking criticism from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights) to some extent 
undermine Denmark’s (and possibly Norden’s) image as being ‘exceptional’ in their 
solidarism with the world’s poor. 
 
 26
Second, however, although internationalist solidarism clearly does remain important to 
the broader Nordic approach to international affairs,12 and Norway, for example, 
continues to present itself as a ‘humanitarian great power’ (Græger 2005: 415),13 the 
Nordics no longer appear exceptional in this regard. Indeed, this element has become a 
broader European concern, with the EU becoming to some extent ‘Nordicised’ in this 
respect. Thus, it is the British government that has led moves towards cancelling Third 
World debt, and as Laatikainen (2003: 427-36) notes, the result is that Nordic 
internationalism is increasingly melding into a more general European profile to the 
extent that specific ‘Nordic positions’ are no longer so clearly identifiable or marketable. 
In turn, this undermines recognition by other actors (states) of the existence of a 
particular Nordic model, position or identity distinct from that of the rest of Europe. One 
notable element here is how the EU (and more particularly the countries of ‘Old Europe’) 
is itself developing an identity in opposition to the United States. In the new European 
identity narratives Europe is depicted as kinder and more sympathetic towards the 
world’s poor and has a stronger belief in the value of international law than the United 
States. As the French Defence Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, has put it, whilst 
Americans prioritise personal success, Europeans focus more on solidarity. Similarly, 
“Europeans understand other people more and understand cultural differences more 
                                                 
12 Examples include Finnish Foreign Minister, Erkki Tuomioja’s, support for the Tobin Tax, and Finnish 
President, Tarja Halonen’s, joint chairmanship of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of 
Globalisation. Another example is the Nordic countries’ new ‘Nordic Africa Initiative’ that aims to enhance 
the accommodation of African interests, particularly in regard to the WTO and the Doha Development 
Agenda. This initiative began with a conference in January 2005 (see Lehtomäki 2005). 
13 Likewise, Østergård (2005: 73) notes that with his sponsorship of the annual Stockholm International 
Forum on the Holocaust that began in 2000, Swedish Prime Minister “Göran Persson entered the world of 
the high politics of morality, almost as an incarnation of his charismatic predecessor Olof Palme”. 
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easily” (quoted in Helsingin Sanomat International Edition 2004). This sounds 
remarkably similar to key discourses concerning Nordic identity and the Nordic model. 
 
Another reason for the demise of a distinctly Nordic brand of internationalist solidarism 
relates to Finland’s and Sweden’s EU membership in 1995 and the EU’s increasing 
desire to speak with a single voice on the international stage through the development of 
the CFSP. In this context, whilst the Nordic EU members might band together to try and 
get their preferences to the top of the EU agenda, they are increasingly restricted in their 
ability to present distinctly ‘Nordic’ positions to the international audience. As 
Laatikainen (2003: 435) puts it in regard to Nordic policy within the UN: 
 
The focus of continued Nordic cooperation is not to present a 
cohesive, autonomous Nordic position to the rest of the world, but to 
work together informally to find ways of influencing European policy 
within the UN. 
 
Similarly Vesa (2001: 61, 68) notes that since membership Finland’s key reference group 
in the UN has shifted from the Nordic group to the EU, even if close cooperation with the 
other Nordic countries remains important at less visible levels. The same is true in the 
Council of Europe where pan-Nordic cooperation is restricted to issues where the EU has 
not taken a direct stand (Torbiörn 2006). The restrictions and goals of the CFSP have 
therefore undermined the ‘autonomy’ and ‘authority’ of the Nordic group to speak with a 
single voice, and as such has arguably led to a declining cohesion in the Nordic epistemic 
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community that was central to the promotion of the brand previously. In turn this has 
undermined ‘recognition’ of the Nordics as a distinct group by others. 
 
However, despite these challenges to a distinct Nordic role and profile on the 
international stage, in the post-Cold War period the desire to retain a particular Nordic 
mission has remained important. The primary way in which a distinct Nordic profile was 
preserved was by prioritising the Baltic Sea Region as the main focus for Nordic 
internationalist solidarism, with the primary goal being to help the Baltic States and 
Russia in the transition process and by trying to build an extended security community 
within the region. One notable element of this was the restructuring of the Nordic 
Council and the refocusing of its third pillar on cooperation with the Baltic countries and 
northwest Russia.14 However, the Nordic states have been active in many other respects. 
For example, Denmark (with Germany) sponsored the creation of the Council of the 
Baltic Sea States (CBSS), Norway sponsored the creation of the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council (BEAC), whilst Finland, through its Northern Dimension Initiative, played an 
important role in getting northern issues onto the EU agenda. 
 
Within these processes previous elements of Nordic superiority, or of the idea of the 
‘Nordic model’ as something to be exported and copied, have remained apparent, not 
least in the clear desire to spread ‘Nordic’ norms to their southern neighbours. As Archer 
(1999: 62) notes, drawing on Cold War benevolent self-identifications the Nordics have 
engaged with almost missionary zeal, seeing the reproduction of Nordic values, 
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particularly of security and international responsibility, as the ultimate goal. To some 
extent a discourse of ‘Nordic teachers’ and ‘Baltic students’ emerged such that in 1998 
Finnish Foreign Minister, Tarja Halonen, even depicted Finland as Estonia’s 
“godmother” in the development of Estonian-Russian relations (Kansan Uutiset 16 
December 1998). However, central to Nordic actions in the Baltic Sea Region have been 
precisely attempts to export Nordic principles of internationalist solidarism, and arguably 
they have been rather successful (see Bergman 2004a). For example, the desire to spread 
their internationalist values to their Baltic neighbours can be seen in their support for the 
development of a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT), whilst the Baltic States 
have in turn become active in the peacekeeping realm (Bergman 2004b).  
 
The success of the export of principles of internationalist solidarism, however, is also 
evident in that today the Baltic States are beginning to establish a distinct international 
role for themselves by also exporting such principles and the lessons they have learnt 
from the transition process to states further East – especially Belarus, Moldova and 
Ukraine, but also to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (see Miniotaite 2004; Carlsen 
2002: 28). The Nordic states’ problem in this regard is twofold. First, with the Balts’ 
memberships of the EU and NATO in 2004 the transition process in the Baltic Sea 
Region has largely ended and as such so has the Nordics’ post-Cold War mission in the 
region. Second, having successfully exported principles of internationalist solidarism to 
them, the Baltic States appear better equipped than the Nordics in exporting these 
principles further east. As such it appears they might be co-opting a Nordic 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 The first pillar focuses on cultural, educational and linguistic ties amongst the Nordic states. The second 
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internationalist mission, identity and brand for themselves that will not only compete 
with the Nordic brand, but will arguably appear more plausible and attractive to others by 
virtue of their having gone through the transition process themselves (Ilves 2003: 197). In 
the future, then, it may be the ‘Baltic model’, not the ‘Nordic model’ that becomes the 
model to be copied, especially by states in the post-Soviet space, with the Nordic model, 
precisely because of its success in the Baltic Sea Region, in consequence becoming 
largely redundant. 
 
Egalitarian social democracy 
Finally, even on the economic side the idea of Nordic exceptionalism and the Nordic 
Third Way as a distinct brand seem problematic. On the one hand, unified support for the 
economic model has dissipated with many in the Nordic elite no longer buying into the 
brand anymore, let alone wanting to market it. On the other, in the post-Cold War context 
the brand no longer appears to resonate as positively as previously. For example, whilst 
the Nordics have successfully exported broad ideas of internationalist solidarism to the 
Baltic States it is notable that they have failed to convince them of the benefits of the 
Nordic economic model. Indeed, once again the Balts appear to be surpassing the 
Nordics, instead championing a more neo-liberal conception of capitalism imbibed from 
the US and UK and depicting (indeed branding) themselves as progressivist, dynamic, 
reform-minded ‘Tiny Tigers’ who may soon be able to teach some of the older Europeans 
a thing or two on the economic front (Lehti 2004). Thus, whilst the Nordics may maintain 
                                                                                                                                                 
pillar focuses on Nordic-EU relations. 
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their ‘exceptionalism’ with respect to the economic model, whether it will be for export 
anymore as a particularly ‘Nordic brand’ is less clear. 
 
Second, as Patomäki (2000: 133-5) has noted and as indicated above, the Nordic 
economic model has also been challenged in that many within the Nordic economic and 
political elite have begun to reject it in favour of a more neoliberal agenda, even if 
general public opinion is not necessarily in accordance. This process began following the 
end of the Cold War when the Nordic countries, but especially Finland and Sweden, 
slipped into deep economic recession. In 1991 Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt 
commented that whilst the Middle Way between capitalism and communism made sense 
during the Cold War, in the post-Cold War world this was no longer the case. As he put 
it: “no one wants to be a compromise between a system which has turned out to be a 
success and another that has turned out to be a historic catastrophe” (quoted in Trägårdh 
2002: 161). Similarly, Finnish Prime Minister Esko Aho proclaimed “The Nordic Model 
is dead” (quoted in Hanhimäki 1997: 187). Furthermore, at the same time as the 
economic model was being questioned the Nordics’ claims to have created the ultimate 
modern, enlightenment, rational society, where people of all ethnic and religious 
backgrounds might be happily integrated, also became challenged with the growing 
prevalence of racism and the continued rise of anti-immigrant political parties, especially 
in Denmark and Norway (see Pred 2000; Mouritsen 2005) – issues most recently 
illustrated in the furore over the cartoons of Mohammed published in a Danish 
newspaper. To the extent that the Nordic countries stop adhering to and championing the 
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economic model and broader Nordic notions of solidarism then the idea of the continued 
relevance of the model must surely be in question.  
 
At the same time, not everyone has given up on the Nordic economic model. Arguably 
the notion of ‘economic identity’ remains important, which is to say that the Nordic 
economic model has a future to the extent that it continues to be a fundamental element 
of national and Nordic identity discourses – of what it is to be us. These discourses are 
sedimented to different degrees in the Nordic states, being perhaps strongest in Sweden. 
Once identity is in the equation the key question for the future of the economic model is 
not so much whether Nordic models of capitalism are any longer ‘feasible’ (a kind of 
rationalist judgement), but rather the extent to which it is about identity and being. To the 
extent that the idea of being exceptional and different is a central element of Nordic 
identity, then this in itself may be enough reason not to conform to a neo-liberal agenda. 
At the same time, it is important to also note that some politicians continue to champion 
the Nordic model precisely in terms of its economic viability. To quote Finnish Foreign 
Minister Erkki Tuomioja (2004; also see 2003). 
 
We should ask whether we seek to enhance European competitiveness 
through a neoliberal agenda and its one-sided emphasis on labour 
market flexibility, deregulation and profit maximization, or whether 
we base our reforms on the indisputable strengths of the European 
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social model, such as the ones that are particularly evident in the 
Nordic welfare states.15
 
Perhaps a bigger question though, is again the extent to which what was once clearly 
identifiable as a ‘Nordic’ marker and symbol is eliding into a ‘European’ one. Notably, 
Tuomioja here now talks of the ‘European social model’. The Nordics may be presented 
as bastions of this model, and indeed the goal is clearly to Nordicise Europe to some 
degree, but here the Nordic label has dropped out to be replaced with a European brand. 
Similarly, to reflect again on the growing split in transatlantic relations it is evident that 
in constructing their identity in opposition to America, some Europeans are also 
increasingly referring to a developing ‘European model of capitalism’ with a much 
greater social dimension than American neo-liberalism. (Clark 2004). In these debates 
reference to the ‘Nordic model’ appears largely absent, with Europe instead being 
presented as representative of progressivist social democracy – in contrast to 
individualist, neo-liberal America. Thus, whilst key attributes of the Nordic model may 
still have a considerable future, whether they will any longer be thought of as being 
exceptional to the Nordic states (or being in some sense ‘Nordic’) is less clear.16
 
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
15 It is also not lost on such people that the Nordic countries today consistently top the various indexes 
produced to analyse economic competitiveness. It is also worth noting that more positive (if tempered) 
comment on the  Nordic economic model(s) has also be evident in the international media in recent years, 
e.g. Newsweek January 9, 2006. 
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This article started by arguing that ideas of the Nordic model and Norden/Nordicity have 
had two elements to them. First, the Nordic model and particularly ‘Nordic’ approaches 
to economic and international affairs have been important in Nordic and national identity 
construction for the Nordic states. Second, however, there has been the idea that Nordic 
practices represent a model that might be exported and copied by other societies. In both 
instances, Nordic identity and the Nordic model have been associated with being different 
from others. These elements of exceptionalism have then been presented as a brand to 
market to international audiences, the notion being the Nordic countries collectively have 
an experience of norms and practices to offer in the international marketplace of ideas, 
with the Nordic brand ultimately being about what it is to be a ‘good state’. The article 
has argued, however, that the exceptional aspects of Nordicity and the Nordic model are 
becoming increasingly less clear. In terms of ideas of Nordic peacefulness, bridge-
building, internationalist solidarism and the economic model two processes are apparent. 
First, some of the Nordic states are finding it difficult (or simply do not want) to continue 
to adhere to previous ‘Nordic norms’, and appear to have lost interest in even selling a 
Nordic brand anymore. In other words, there has been a significant weakening of the pan-
Nordic epistemic community promoting a Nordic brand that emerged during the Cold 
War. Second, to a significant degree elements of Nordic practices and the Nordic model 
have become Europeanised. The result is that recognition of a distinct Nordic profile in 
international affairs is being undermined. In conclusion, this leaves us with one key 
question: If key elements of the Nordic brand of exceptionalism that have been central to 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 As Stråth (2004: 19) notes, “A somewhat disintegrative factor for the image of a specific Nordic welfare 
model and way to modernity is the European attempt to respond to globalizing forces and re-establish 
political legitimacy and economic growth” (emphasis added). 
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both Nordic identity and the Nordic model are no longer so exceptional, and if it is 
becoming ever harder to identify particular Nordic positions or a Nordic profile and 
international brand, does this matter? 
 
The question might be answered in two ways. First, it is interesting to look at the 
implications of declining recognition for the brand of Nordic internationalism. To provide 
a positive spin, there is no need to mourn this undermining of the ‘Nordic brand’ since its 
very demise might be seen as representing a staggering success for Nordic ideals and the 
Nordic model – especially to the extent that internationalist and solidarist elements have 
become Europeanised and accepted as a part of the EU’s international profile. The 
Nordicisation of the EU and the Europeanisation of key elements of the Nordic model 
should be welcomed and we should not cling to the Nordic label or mourn the loss of 
Nordic difference and exceptionalism out of egoistic reasons of the need for recognition. 
As such, Tuomioja’s (2004) repackaging of the Nordic brand in European terms (rather 
than seeing the Nordic as different and better than negatively framed ‘European models’ 
as during the Cold War) is an interesting development. So long as people are promoting 
‘Nordic’ values we should not be concerned if they are labelled ‘European’ rather than 
‘Nordic’. Likewise, we should not be sad if the Nordic reference group and ability to 
influence is replaced by other groupings of which the Nordics are a part (e.g., EU). 
 
However, a more cautious perspective is also warranted as it is unclear that all that has 
happened is the repackaging of the Nordic brand in European terms. This is to say that 
arguably the Nordics have not been completely successful in marketing their brand of 
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internationalism to their European partners. Instead, it rather seems that at least some of 
the Nordic countries have been influenced by, and begun to buy into, either US or other 
brands of internationalism currently on offer. In short, Nordic internationalism, as 
traditionally defined, is not the same as Bushian/Blairite neo-liberal 
neoconservative/theologically-inspired internationalism, or arguably even the same as the 
universalising internationalism of some of the ‘old Europeans’. As Lawler (2005) has 
argued, what is being lost with the melding of the Nordic brand of internationalism with 
Western/European internationalist approaches more generally is a social democratic 
inspired alternative to the current liberalist agendas, with their focus on opening markets 
and individualist understandings of social order. In contrast, the social democratic 
inspired Nordic brand has traditionally been one that emphasises the right of countries to 
choose their own path (rather than have a model imposed on them) and that arguably has 
a better track record when it comes to emphasising issues of distributive justice and 
egalitarianism in world politics (see Bergman’s article). 
 
The second way of answering the question is to look at the relationship between the 
Nordic brand of exceptionalism and particular constructions of Nordic identity. Arguably, 
if the Nordic model and a distinctive Nordic international profile are disappearing then 
this raises questions for the construction of national identities in the Nordic area. For 
example, will the Nordic marker lose any relevance whatsoever and instead be replaced 
by the marker of ‘Europe’? Will ideas of Nordicity be reduced to simply cultural, 
geographic and historic elements? Would this necessarily be a bad thing? Perhaps the key 
question here is how essential the idea/brand of ‘exceptionalism’ is to Nordic identity and 
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whether Nordicity can be told in different ways? Here, it is interesting to note the tension 
within the Nordic brand between its identity element of exceptionalism (implying 
constant difference) and its emphasis on being a model (implying others can become like 
us). The result is that to the extent that the brand has been successfully sold it threatens its 
very existence as a model of exceptionalism. Thus, to the extent that being Nordic is 
equated with being ‘different’, ‘exceptional’ and ‘better than’ others then accepting the 
demise of the Nordic may be difficult. Importantly, though, such a development may be 
easier for some than others. In particular, for the Finns the melding of the Nordic with the 
European is less problematic since historically a Nordic identification has been seen as 
bringing them closer to Europe and the West. In contrast, for Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden ‘Nordic’ has been told more in contradistinction from ‘Europe’. Thus, whilst all 
might have bought into the Nordic brand, some of the countries may be better able to 
cope with its demise than others, and for whom the desire to reconstitute a Nordic brand 
of exceptionalism may be stronger and result in renewed efforts to be norm entrepreneurs 
in the future.  
 
This returns us to the initial distinction made between the concepts of brand and identity. 
On the one hand, one of the article’s implicit arguments has been that whereas during the 
Cold War a pan-Nordic elite found a clear interest in marketing a collective Nordic brand 
(not least to distance the region from the Cold War, but also to promote norms, values 
and an experience understood as distinctly ‘Nordic’), today such a collective interest has 
weakened. The consequent decline of the pan-Nordic community might explain why the 
Nordic brand has ossified around largely Cold War understandings, rather than 
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developing and being updated with a new model and a re-branding of the Nordic in 
terms, for example, of the networked society, or a kind of Nokia Norden. Whilst this is 
happening at national levels (e.g. Castells and Himanen 2002) the idea that the Nordic 
countries might share a strategic interest in such a project seems absent. Finally, however, 
even if the future of the Nordic brand is in the balance, the loss of this brand would not 
entail the end of Nordic identity(ies) as such, even though the brand of exceptionalism 
and the model has been constitutive of these identities to some extent. What it might 
mean though is that Nordic identity may need to be reconstituted around other elements 
where being ‘exceptional’ would be less important and where the foundationalist myth of 
Nordic exceptionalism might, for example, be replaced by a more positive reading of 
Europe.
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